

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 165606

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 165606 ACTION OTTAWA INFO
BONN LONDON GENEVA ISLAMABAD NATO PARIS NEW DELHI
IAEA VIENNA USUN NEW YORK TOKYO ROME EC BRUSSELS
BUENOS AIRES THE HAGUE GERMANTOWN 30 JULY.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 165606

LIMDIS

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CAN

SUBJ: US-CANADIAN CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION,
JULY 25, 1974

DISTO

1. ELEVEN-MAN CANADIAN GROUP, HEADED BY MICHEL DUPUY,
ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
IN MINEXTAFF, AND INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF AECB,
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EMBASSY, AND DEPARTMENTS OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE,
AND ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES, CONSULTED ON NON-
PROLIFERATION ISSUES HERE JULY 25. US PARTICIPANTS, HEADED
BY ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE, INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE
(PM, EUR, S/P, C, NEA, SCI) AND AEC AS WELL AS ACDA.

2. CANADIANS CONVEYED IMPRESSION THEY FULLY INTEND TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FIRM POSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF NON-PROLIFERATION. THEY CONFIRMED THEY WOULD TAKE HARD LINE IN CONSULTATIONS WITH INDIANS JULY 29-30. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN LONGER TERM STRENGTHENING OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME AND UPGRADING SAFEGUARDS. IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT CANADIANS ARE ALSO VERY CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE COMMERCIAL DISADVANTAGES THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM UPHOLDING STRICT POSITIONS ON SAFEGUARDS. THUS, THEIR DECISIONS ON NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES WILL DEPEND ON ATTITUDES OF OTHER KEY NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, PARTICULARLY US. WE EMPHASIZED TO CANADIANS THAT, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT TAKEN

FINAL DECISIONS ON MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF NON-PROLIFERATION, WE REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVE. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON BROAD RANGE OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS RELATED TO NON-PROLIFERATION WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN GREATER IMMEDIACY BY INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

3. IN OPENING REMARKS, IKLE SAID WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. HE REAFFIRMED OUR COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND TO NPT, AND OUR INTENTION TO WORK VIGOROUSLY TO DEFEND AND STRENGTHEN IT. WE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN WIDE RANGING REVIEW OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO TAKE IN SUPPORT OF NON-PROLIFERATION.

4. DUPUY SAID THERE NO DOUBT US AND CANADA HAVE COMMON OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. CANADA HAD BEEN "SHOCKED" BY INDIAN TEST, AND ITS MISGIVINGS ABOUT PROLIFERATION GREATLY INCREASED. NPT MUST BE STRENGTHENED AND GOC, IN ADDITION TO PREPARATION FOR INDIAN CONSULTATIONS, IS REVIEWING LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN TEST FOR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. IT IS ANXIOUS TO INCORPORATE US VIEWS AND THOSE OF OTHERS
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IN ITS REVIEW. DUPUY NOTED THAT INTERNATIONAL PROCESS OF ACCOMMODATION TO INDIAN TEST, IN NAME OF "REALISM", HAS ALREADY BEGUN AND THERE IS CORRESPONDING NEED TO TIGHTEN UP ON PROLIFERATION POSSIBILITIES AT SAME TIME, IN ORDER TO TRY TO "CONTAIN EFFECTS" OF INDIAN TEST. SUCCESS OF SUCH A POLICY WILL DEPEND ON SOLIDARITY, PARTICULARLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWERS, BUT ALSO OF OTHER MAJOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. CANADA BELIEVED THIS POLICY HAD GOOD POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS, BUT, AT THIS STAGE, IT WOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO REVEAL INTENTIONS TO INDIA. LINE TAKEN WITH INDIA IN OTTAWA CONSULTATIONS WOULD THEREFORE BE "VERY FIRM".

5. IKLE NOTED THAT DELICATE BALANCE WOULD BE NEEDED IN

ORDER TO ACHIEVE CONTAINMENT OF EFFECTS OF INDIAN TEST. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN TECHNOLOGY, AND MORE GENERAL SPREAD OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, COULD NOT BE STOPPED, BUT IT SEEMS FEASIBLE AS WELL AS DESIRABLE TO GAIN TIME FOR STRENGTHENING NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME BY SLOWING DOWN THESE DEVELOPMENTS. OBJECTIVES IN REGARD TO INDIA MIGHT REALISTICALLY INCLUDE SLOWING THEIR TEST PROGRAM AND NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT, PREVENTING ACCUMULATION OF A STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AND WORKING OUT SOME SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS. IKLE DESCRIBED US ACTIONS WITH INDIA ON TARAPUR REACTORS, NOTING THAT WE HAD RECEIVED DISAPPOINTING REPLY TO REQUEST FOR ASSURANCES

ON TARAPUR MATERIALS. INDIANS DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE THAT MATERIALS SUPPLIED TO THEM COULD NOT BE USED FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. THEY CHOSE INSTEAD TO TELL US THAT WE COULD BUY BACK ALL PLUTONIUM NOT USED IN THE TARAPUR REACTOR, WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE ONLY OUR TECHNICAL OBJECTIVE IN REGARD TO INDIAN USE OF TARAPUR MATERIALS.

6. DUPUY SAID INDIAN REPLY TO US NO SURPRISE, SINCE INDIANS ARE DETERMINED NOT TO SURRENDER ON ISSUE OF USE OF SECOND GENERATION PLUTONIUM OR RIGHT TO PNES. CANADIAN INCLINATION IN THEIR OWN CASE, THEREFORE, IS NOT TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER "STERILE" DISCUSSION OF INTERPRETATION OF EXISTING NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS, BUT TO SEEK PRACTICAL WAYS TO IMPAIR INDIAN PNE PROGRAMS. IN RESPONSE
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TO DUPUY'S QUESTION AS TO POSSIBLE LEVERAGE ON INDIA GIVEN US BY ITS SUPPLY OF FUEL FOR TARAPUR REACTORS, US PARTICIPANTS NOTED DANGER THAT INDIA MIGHT DENOUNCE TARAPUR AGREEMENT, DECLARING THAT WE HAD ABROGATED IT, AF THUS ELIMINATE ALL SAFEGUARDS ON REACTORS. DUPUY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CANADA IS SIMILARLY, AND TO GREATER EXTENT, VULNERABLE IN REGARD TO RAJASTHAN REACTORS. SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR THESE REACTORS ENDS IN 1976 AND COVERS SECOND GENERATION PLUTONIUM FOR ONLY FIVE YEARS.

7. IN REGARD TO CIRRUUS REACTOR, DUPUY SAID THAT NO CONCESSION WOULD BE GIVEN TO INDIA IN JULY 29 CONSULTATIONS. IN SPITE OF CANADIAN PREFERENCE NOT TO DEBATE FURTHER OVER INTERPRETATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS, CANADIANS WOULD ATTEMPT TO GET FUTURE AND RETROACTIVE GUARANTEE THAT INDIANS WOULD NOT USE PLUTONIUM FOR PNES. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH GUARANTEE IS OBTAINABLE, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN INDIAN COMMITMENT NOT TO USE NEWLY PRODUCED PLUTONIUM FOR PNES. ONLY CLEAR WAY TO CONTROL PREVIOUSLY PRODUCED PLUTONIUM WOULD BE TO GET INDIA TO ACCEPT MORATORIUM ON EXPLOSIONS, WHICH WOULD GIVE OTHERS TIME TO BUILD INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON INDIANS NOT TO TEST FURTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

8. IKLE SAID OUR IDEAS WERE SIMILAR. WE COULD NOT PREVENT INDIA FROM HAVING A SUPPLY OF PLUTONIUM AND WE THEREFORE HOPED THE INDIANS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO CONDUCT FEWER EXPLOSIONS OR NONE. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING FEASIBILITY OF INDIAN AGREEMENT ON DE FACTO COOPERATION NOT TO EXPORT UNSAFEGUARDED MATERIALS OR TECHNOLOGY.

9. DUPUY, IN RESPONSE TO US QUESTION, SAID PAKISTAN APPEARED TO SHARE CANADIAN VIEWS ON INADMISSIBILITY OF

PNES, BUT THAT THERE WAS NO FIRM AGREEMENT ON HIS SUBJECT IN REGARD TO KANUPP REACTOR, WHICH IS COVERED BY IAEA SAFEGUARDS. CANADIANS HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE PAKISTANIS ARE "PLAYING A DEVIOUS GAME." ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THEY FAIL TO GET WHAT THEY CONSIDER ADEQUATE SECURITY GUARANTEES, THEY MIGHT DECIDE TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. IN DISCUSSION OF PAKISTAN, DUPUY
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NOTED THAT CANADA MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ARGUE THAT PNE SERVICES SHOULD BE PROVIDED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGENCY TO NON-NPT PARTIES, ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNIZED THIS COULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON ATTITUDES TOWARD ADHERENCE TO NPT. US PARTICIPANTS TOLD CANADIANS WE BELIEVED NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT THAT PAKISTAN IS REPORTEDLY SEEKING SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED, AND THAT WE SEE ADVANTAGES IN ENCOURAGING MULTINATIONAL REPROCESSING PLANTS.

10. IN CONTEXT OF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF UPGRADING SAFEGUARDS, US PARTICIPANTS DESCRIBED SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WE PROPOSE TO INCLUDE IN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IN RESPONSE TO CANADIAN QUESTION, IKLE SAID WE MIGHT ALSO STRENGTHEN EXPORT CONTROLS IN OTHER AREAS. DUPUY SAID CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD WILLINGLY TIGHTEN SAFEGUARDS AND RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF DOING SO WOULD BE REDUCED BY FACT THAT NUCLEAR EXPORT MARKET WILL BE STEADILY EXPANDING. HOWEVER, CANADA DOES NOT WISH TO BE IN VANGUARD OF SUCH A MOVEMENT IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD, AND THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS, IF OTHER SUPPLIERS, E.G., FRENCH, UNDERCUT RESTRICTIONS. DUPUY NOTED THAT CANADIANS PLAN TO CONSULT WITH FRENCH ON THESE ISSUES. IKLE AGREED THAT EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH WOULD BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE.

11. IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF ZANGGER COMMITTEE, CANADIANS EXPRESSED SOME APPREHENSION OVER CONTINUED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS TO SUCH NON-NPT PARTIES AS SPAIN, JAPAN AND EURATOM COUNTRIES. IN PARTICULAR, CANADIANS SEEMED TO FEEL JAPAN MIGHT NOT RATIFY NPT AND

MIGHT NOT EVEN GIVE ASSURANCES THAT SUCH MATERIALS COULD NOT BE USED FOR AN EXPLOSIVE NUCLEAR DEVICE. US PARTICIPANTS DOUBTED THIS ASSESSMENT AND COMMENTED THAT IN OUR VIEW SIGNERS OF NPT, WHO INTEND TO RATIFY, SHOULD BE DIFFERENTIATED FROM NON-SIGNATORIES. CANADIANS REPLIED THAT STATES INTENDING TO RATIFY NPT SHOULD NOT OBJECT TO GIVING ASSURANCES ON EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. CANADIANS THUS FAVORED OBTAINING ASSURANCES AND SUGGESTED CONSULTATIONS AMONG KEY SUPPLIERS OUTSIDE FRAMEWORK OF ZANGGER COMMITTEE

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ON THIS AND OTHER EXPORT PROBLEMS. IN REGARD TO FUEL SHIPMENTS TO EURATOM COUNTRIES, US PARTICIPANTS SAID WE CONTINUED TO RELY ON EXPECTATION THAT IAEA-EURATOM VERIFICATION AGREEMENT WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE. IN DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH EC MEMBERS, WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE MOST RECENT AMENDMENT TO OUR AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION MAKES OUR UNDERSTANDING TO DELIVER ADDITIONAL FUEL SUBJECT TO OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER NPT.

12. IN REGARD TO ATUCHA REACTOR IN ARGENTINA, DUPUY SAID CANADIANS HAD ALREADY ASKED ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT PROHIBITION ON USE OF MATERIAL FOR PNES; NO RESPONSE HAD BEEN RECEIVED. IN THE EVENT OF A NEGATIVE RESPONSE, CANADA WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS AND WOULD IN ANY CASE HOPE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US.

13. CONSULTATIONS REPORTED ABOVE BEGAN AT 10:30 A.M., CONTINUED THROUGH LUNCH AND BRIEFLY RESUMED AFTERWARDS. GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WERE FOLLOWED BY SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS AT WORKING LEVEL OF ACDA-AECB UNATTENDED SAFEGUARDS INSTRUMENTATION, AND NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE ISSUES. IN REGARD LATTER, CANADIANS WERE TOLD THAT WHILE WE HAVE MADE NO DECISIONS ON SPECIFIC INITIATIVES FOR CONFERENCE, WE RECOGNIZE THAT INDIAN TEST HAS MADE IT MORE IMPORTANT THAT CONFERENCE SATISFY PARTIES AND POTENTIAL PARTIES. WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE NPT MORE EFFECTIVE. AMONG POSSIBLE INITIATIVES WE ARE CONSIDERING MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE V ON PNES WITH VIEW CONVINCING OTHER TREATY PARTIES THAT DEVELOPMENT OF PNE CAPABILITIES ON INDIAN MODEL DOES NOT OFFER BENEFITS COMPARABLE TO THOSE UNDER NPT. KISSINGER UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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